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court tersely stated that the sentence lacked 
any indicia that the higher sum would be 
awarded. 
-- -- The court substantiated their construc-
tion of the statute by examining the legis-
lative history behind 36-308. The court 
found the following reasons to include the 
80% provision in the statute: (1) cost sav-
ing; (2) prevention of disability recipients' 
receipt of more after tax income than if 
they worked; and (3) the preservation of 
the work incentive. Report of the D. C. City 
Council Committee on Housing and Eco-
nomic Development on Bill 3-106, 01/08/80, 
pp. 4, 16-17. The court concluded that the 
petitioners failed to demonstrate why these 
goals were not attained by applying the 
80% provision to them and others in their 
disability categories. 
The McDaniel court clarifies the mean-
ing of36-308. It is now clear that claimants 
are entitled to the lesser of 80% of their 
spendable earnings or 66 213% of their aver-
age weekly wage. The court's strict in-
terpretation of 36-308 narrows the avenue 
of statutory attack available to workers' 
compensation claimants. Future attack on 
36-308 will be best pursued through the 
legislative process. 
-Avery Berdit 
Staley 'D. Board of Education of 
Washington County: ATTORNEY'S 
FEES ALLOWED EVEN THOUGH 
AMOUNT PAID IN WORKERS' 
COMPENSATION CLAIM 
EXCEEDED TOTAL SUM DUE 
UNDER A MODIFIED AWARD. 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in 
Staley v. Board of Education of Washington 
County, 308 Md. 42, 517 A.2d 349 (1986) 
held that an employer and its insurer 
were required to pay legal fees to a work-
ers' compensation claimant's attorney even 
though the amount already paid to the 
claimant exceeded the total amount due 
under a modified award. In so holding, the 
court of appeals reversed the court of spe-
cial appeals and affirmed the circuit court 
ruling. 
Claimant Joy M. Renehan Staley, a 
school teacher, fractured her hip in the 
course of her employment. The Work-
ers' Compensation Commission (Commis-
sion) determined that Ms. Staley suffered 
a 55% permanent partial disability and 
set compensation benefits accordingly. 
Ms. Staley's employer and the insurer ap-
pealed the Commission's order to the Cir-
cuit Court of Maryland for Washington 
County. There the circuit court deter-
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mined that the Commission had erred and 
ruled that Ms. Staley suffered only a 35% 
permanent partial disability. The court 
therein modified her award commensur-
ately. 
While the appeal to the circuit court was 
in progress, the employer had been paying 
disability benefits at the rate set for 55% 
disability. By the time Ms. Staley's award 
was modified by the circuit court, the ac-
cumulated amount already paid to her was 
$9,000 higher than the total modified 
amount. In addition, claimant's attorney 
had properly filed for, and had been ap-
proved by the Commission, attorney's fees 
at an amount commensurate to the 55% 
disability rate. When the claimant's dis-
ability award was modified, claimant's 
attorney filed a new petition and the Com-
mission reduced the attorney's fees com-
mensurate to the modified award. Both 
Commission approvals called for the at-
torney's fees to be paid out of the final 
weeks of claimant's disability payments. 
When Ms. Staley's attorney was not paid 
his legal fees, he first filed issues with the 
Commission to require the employer to 
pay the awarded attorney's fees. After the 
attorney (again) was found to be entitled to 
his fees Ms. Staley's employer appealed 
this order to the circuit court where the 
Commission's decision was upheld. The 
employer then appealed to the court of 
special appeals. The court of special ap-
peals reversed the circuit court basing their 
decision on their belief that there were no 
reserve funds remaining for the benefit of 
the attorney. The court of appeals then 
granted certiorari. 
In analyzing the issue herein, the court 
of appeals looked to two specific statutes 
under Maryland law. Judge Couch, writing 
for the majority, concluded that under 
Md. Ann. Code art. 101 § 57 (1985) and 
COMAR 14.19.01.21F(Rule21 F), when 
attorney's fees are approved by the Com-
mission, a lien is placed upon the compen-
sation award in the amount approved. 
When a fee petition is filed by an attorney, 
the employer and its insurer are put on no-
tice, and must put in escrow, the amount 
requested in the petition until the Com-
mission approves the fee request. See 
Md. Ann. Code art. 101 § 57 (1985) and 
COMAR 14.09.01.21F. The escrow ac-
count and the lien on the funds therein re-
main in existence until the attorney re-
ceives his due compensation. 308 Md. at 
48, 517 A.2d at 352, citing Hoffman v. 
Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, 232 
Md. 51, 55-56, 191 A.2d 575, 577-79 
(1962). 
After looking at the two statutes, the 
court concluded that on the date of filing 
of the attorney's fee petition, the employer 
and its insurer were put on notice to segre-
gate the amount requested from claimant's 
award and place it into escrow. Once the 
attorney's fees were approved by the Com-
mission, the lien on that approved amount 
materialized. The escrow amount and the 
lien were not extinguished when the cir-
cuit court modified claimant's award. The 
only effect of the Commission's subsequent 
modified fee award was to change the sum 
held in escrow to the modified amount. Id. 
at 49, 517 A.2d at 352. 
The court herein made it clear that this 
procedure for attorney's fees is followed 
even in the event that there is an overpay-
ment in compensation. The court relied 
on the reasoning in Hoffman, supra. There, 
the Commission awarded compensation that 
was subsequently reduced on appeal. As in 
the case herein, the total modified award 
was less than what the insurer had already 
paid out. But in Hoffman, money had been 
put in escrow to satisfy attorney's fees. The 
insurer therein refused to pay attorney's 
fees arguing that when the court reduced 
the award, there was no money left upon 
which a lien could attach. In rejecting the 
insurer's contention, the court of appeals 
therein wrote that "an insurance carrier 
cannot defeat an attorney's statutory lien 
by applying funds held in escrow to satisfy 
an overpayment to a claimant." Hoffman, 
232 Md. at 55-56, 191 A.2d at 587 .. Judge 
Couch concluded that Hoffman applies 
equally as well in this case. 
The court in Staley also analyzed the 
court of special appeals' rationale for their 
reversal. The court of special appeals rea-
soned that funds for satisfaction of at-
torney's fees were accumulated only from 
the final weeks of compensation due a 
claimant. Because there was an overpay-
ment here, the appellees were no longer 
able to reserve funds to pay the attorney. 
The court of appeals rejected this rationale 
on two grounds. First, the lower court's 
reasoning ignores the "clear requirement 
of Rule 21 F that compensation funds must 
be placed in an escrow account no later 
than at the time the attorney files his fee 
petition. It is simply incorrect to conclude 
that the escrow account remains empty un-
til one reaches the final weeks of compen-
sation." 308 Md. at 51,517 A.2d at 353. 
Second, and "more fundamentally," Judge 
Couch argued, "the intermediate appellate 
court's approach would encourage those in 
appellee's position to postpone establish-
ing an escrow account and placing com-
pensation funds therein until after an 
appeal of the claimant's award has been 
decided." Id. at 52, 517 A.2d at 353-54. 
The court herein was quick to point out 
that this decision is in no way inconsistent 
with Feissner v. Prince George's County, 
282 Md. 413, 384 A.2d 742 (1978). In 
Feissner, liability of the employer and its 
insurer was simultaneously discharged un-
der a statutory offset provision when the 
claimant received superior benefits from a 
government pension plan. This discharge 
occurred before the attorney had filed a fee 
petition. However, in the case herein as 
well as in Hoffman, the appellee's liability 
was not discharged. The attorney's lien 
"subsequently did attach to a portion 
thereof, obligating the appellees to pay 
claimant's attorney." Id. at 53, 517 A.2d 
at 354. 
The court in Staley has clarified any am-
biguity that may have existed concerning 
the procedures to follow for attorney fees 
stemming from workers' compensation 
cases. It is clear that the court here has 
rightfully placed the interests of the com-
pensation claimant ahead of governmental 
bureaucracy. 
- Christopher Hale 
Dade County School Board v. Polite: 
FLORIDA ACCEPTS THE 
PREMISES EXCEPTION TO THE 
GOING AND COMING RULE FOR 
WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
BENEFITS. 
In Dade County School Board v. Polite, 
495 So.2d 795 (Fla.App. 1 Dist. 1986), the 
District Court of Appeal of Florida af-
firmed the Deputy Commissioner's deter-
mination that a teacher's injuries were 
compensable in that they arose out of and 
in the course of employment. The District 
Court of Appeal of Florida also held that 
the teacher was not precluded from receiv-
ing benefits by the rule that an employee 
going and coming from work is normally 
considered outside the scope of his employ-
ment, thereby recognizing the premises 
exception. 
In Dade County, a physical education 
teacher, Ms. Cheryl Polite, was injured 
when her automobile was struck by a hit-
and-run driver after she had left a track 
meet. At the time of the accident she was 
returning the track equipment to the school 
from which she had borrowed it. Polite 
was employed by the Dade County School 
Board as a physical education teacher. 
Polite taught at North Glade Elementary 
School in the morning and at Lake Stevens 
Elementary School in the afternoon, five 
days a week. Although her workday offi-
cially ended at 3:05 p.m. daily, Polite par-
ticipated in after-school activities which 
were officially encouraged and reflected in 
a positive fashion on teacher evaluations. 
Throughout Polite's employment she had 
consistently participated in extracurricu-
lar activities with which the Dade County 
School Board had knowledge of and given 
its approval. 
On the day of the accident, a track meet 
involving students from Polite's morning 
school, North Glade, was held at Skylake 
Elementary School in the afternoon. Polite 
was to teach physical education at Lake 
Stevens Elementary School that afternoon, 
but, on this day the Lake Stevens' students 
were released from school at 1 :45 p.m. 
Nevetheless, Polite was required to remain 
until 3:05 p.m. Polite then requested and 
was granted permission to leave Lake 
Stevens earlier than 3:05 p.m. Before leav-
ing Polite collected some of Lake Stevens' 
track equipment which she knew might be 
needed at the track meet. Because she felt 
that the equipment might be needed the fol-
lowing day by Lake Stevens' instructors, 
Polite intended to return the equipment 
immediately following the track meet. 
Ms. Polite went to the track meet and as-
sisted at the starting line. She left Skylake 
before 4:00 p.m. traveling the only road 
leading away from the school en route to 
Lake Stevens to return the track equip-
ment. While on the road, Polite's auto-
mobile was struck in the rear by a hit-and-
run driver, causing injury to her back, foot, 
right knee and right hand. 
Appellants Dade County School District 
and their insurer, Gallagher Bassett Insur-
ance Service, argued that Polite's claims 
for medical expenses should be denied be-
cause of the "going and coming rule." In 
the alternative, the appellants argued that 
Polite's injuries were not compensable be-
cause attendance at the meet was not in the 
course of her employment because there 
was no requirement that she attend. The 
Deputy Commissioner in determining that 
the injuries were compensable held that 
the "after hours teacher participation was 
expected and considered in performance 
evaluations." 495 So.2d at 797. The Dep-
uty Commissioner further held that Ms. 
Polite was not precluded from benefits by 
the going and coming rule because she 
was not traveling to her home, but was 
en route back to Lake Stevens to return the 
track equipment. Therefore, the commis-
sioner determined that the injuries arose 
out of and in the course of Polite's employ-
ment, thereby allowing the medical bene-
fits sought and not precluding them by the 
going and coming rule. Id. at 797. 
The District Court of Appeal of Florida, 
in affirming the Deputy Commissioner's 
determinations, stated that the encourage-
ment and reward by way of positive perfor-
mance teacher evaluations was "compe-
tent" and "substantial evidence" to show 
Polite was in the course of her employ-
ment. Id. at 797. Further support for the 
court's holding was found in the fact that 
Polite "did not merely elect to attend" the 
after school activity since the activity was 
related to her field of expertise. The court 
also found other evidence from which it 
could have been reasonably inferred that 
"Polite arrived and assisted at the meet at 
least partially during her regular working 
hours, since she sought and obtained offi-
cial permission to leave her afternoon as-
signment early in order to attend." Id. 
In affirming the commissioner's decision 
that medical benefits are not precluded by 
the "going and coming rule," the court first 
stated the general proposition expounded 
in Stacy v. Cherry Farms, Inc., 449 So.2d 
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